000			02763nam a2200169Ia 4500
020			_a0826497527
082			_a191 _bRUS
100			_aRust, Joshua
245			_aJohn Searle
260			_aNew York _bContinuum International Pub. Group _c2009
300			_aix,174p.
440			_aContinuum contemporary american thinkers series
500			_aCONTENTS Acknowledgments ix Introduction 1 1. Fundamental Ontology : External Realism and Scientific Naturalism 3 External Realism 5 Scientific Naturalism 8 Conceptual Relativity and Searle's Scientific Naturalism 11 2. Consciousness and Materialist Theories of Mind 15 Searle's Foil: Materialist Theories of Mind 16 Searle's Critiques of Materialist Theories of Mind 18 Searle's Answer to the Mind-Body Problem : Biological Naturalism 26 3. Intentional Mental States 32 An Imperfect Analogy: Intentional Content as a Model 33 Psychological Modes 36 Extending the Theory 41 4. Reason and Action 46 Three Senses of the Word Because 47 Anscombe on the Force of the Becausec 48 Davidson on the Force of the Becausee 50 Searle's Account of Action in Intentionality 51 Searle's Account of Action in Rationality in Action 54 Freedom and Scientific Naturalism : The Ontological Question 64 5. From Acts to Speech Acts: The Intention to Communicate 66 Two Conceptions of Meaning: Speech Acts and the Communication-Intention Theorists 67 What Distinguishes Speech Acts from Other Kinds of Action? Introduction to the Illocutionary Intentions 73 The First Illocutionary Condition of a Speech Act 74 The Second Illocutionary Condition of a Speech Act 78 The Third Illocutionary Condition of a Speech Act 78 Searle's Gricean Model of Illocutionary Acts : Summary 81 6. From Sounds to Words : The Intention to Represent 83 Austin and Searle on Speech Acts 83 Perlocutionary Intentions and the Sincerity Condition 89 From Sounds to Words : The Bridge from the Speaker's Illocutionary Intention to the Hearer's Understanding 94 A Taxonomy of Speech Acts 100 7. On the Meaning of Meaning: Critical Remarks 107 A New Conception of Meaning 107 Is Searle's Original Criticism of Grice Compelling? 113 Is Searle's Criticism of Searle Compelling? 116 8. The Construction of Social Reality 119 Acts That Achieve Their Aims by Conventional Means 119 Institutional Facts 121 The Creation of Institutional Facts 131 On the Codifiability of Deontic Powers : A Criticism 134 9. Topics Concerning Institutional Reality : Reasons, Language, Politics, and the Background 136 Desire-Independent Reasons for Action 136 Institutional Reality, Language, and Normativity 138 Institutional and Political Reality 143 The Background 144 Notes 154 Bibliography 167 Index 171 64
890			_aUnited States
891			_aFAH - MAJ
999			_c19787 _d19787