Series Editor's Introduction5 Introduction 7 1. Representing Games: Extensive and Normal Forms 11 Primitive Concepts11 The Extensive or Game Tree Form of Representation 12 The Normal or Matrix Form of Representation 16 Representing Games: The 1967 Middle East Crisis17 Concluding Comments 20 2. Zero-Sum Games: Conflict at the Extreme 21 Introduction 21 Zero-Sum Games with a Saddlepoint 22 Zero-Sum Games without a Saddlepoint 28 Some Problems with Mixed Strategies 34 Concluding Comments 36 3. Nonzero-Sum Games: The Rest of the Continuum 36 Introduction 36 A Comparison of Zero-Sum and Nonzero-Sum Games 37 An Economic Policy Game 42 A Watergate Game 44 A Biblical Game 47 Prisoners' Dilemma and the Problem of Inefficient Equilibria 51 Paradox Lost? 53 Concluding Comments 62 4. N-Person Games 64 Introduction 64 A Three-Person Game: The Geneva Conference of 1954 64 The Characteristic Function Form of Representation 71 The Core 74 The von Neumann-Morgenstern V-Solution 78 The Theory of Minimal Winning Coalitions 82 The Shapley Value and the Power Index 85 Concluding Comments 90 Notes 90 References 93 About the Author 96