Fiscal federalism
Oates Wallace E.
Fiscal federalism - Cheltenham Edward Elgar Pub. Ltd. 2011 - xx,256p.
Contents
Preface
Preface to the paperback edition
Introduction 21
Chapter One
An Economic Approach to Federalism
The economic case for centralized government
The economic case for decentralized government
The optimal form of government: a federal system
The economic meaning of federalism
Appendix: Local-Government Countercyclical Policy
Chapter Two
The Division of Functions Among Levels of Government
An ideal case: a perfect correspondence
The determination of the optimal-sized jurisdiction
The problem of interjurisdictional externalities
The costs of collective decision-making Consumer mobility and congestion costs
Appendix: The Decentralization Theorem and the
Optimal-Sized Jurisdiction 54
Chapter Three
The Theory and Use of Intergovernmental Grants 65
External effects and unit subsidies or taxes
Imperfect correspondence and intergovernmental grants
Conditional and unconditional grants and resource allocation
Unconditional intergovernmental grants and the redistribution of income
Unconditional grants and the problem of horizontal equity
Some reflections on the theory and use of intergovernmental grants
Appendix A: Reciprocal Externalities and Inter
governmental Grants 95
Appendix B: Intergovernmental Grants in a Model
of Collective Choice 105
Chapter Four
Taxation and Debt Finance in a Federal System 119
Criteria for the evaluation of a tax system Local spending and taxation: an analytic framework
A model of efficient local finance
The use of nonbenefit taxes by local governments Some further problems in local taxation
The case for tax harmonization A further role for intergovernmental grants: revenue sharing Debt finance in a federal system
Appendix: The Effects of Property Taxes and Local
Public Spending on Property Values:
An Empirical Study of Tax Capitaliza
tion and the Tiebout Hypothesis 162
Chapter Five
An Empirical Study of Federal Finance 181
Public policy for high employment and stable prices Public redistributive activity
An econometric study of the degree of fiscal centrali-zation Decentralization and the size of the public sector
Appendix: Complete Set of Regression Equations 214
Chapter Six
The Dynamics of Federalism
Dynamic tendencies in fiscal federalism Historical tendencies in fiscal centralization
The future of fiscal federalism
Data Appendix
Index
9780857939944
336 / OAT
Fiscal federalism - Cheltenham Edward Elgar Pub. Ltd. 2011 - xx,256p.
Contents
Preface
Preface to the paperback edition
Introduction 21
Chapter One
An Economic Approach to Federalism
The economic case for centralized government
The economic case for decentralized government
The optimal form of government: a federal system
The economic meaning of federalism
Appendix: Local-Government Countercyclical Policy
Chapter Two
The Division of Functions Among Levels of Government
An ideal case: a perfect correspondence
The determination of the optimal-sized jurisdiction
The problem of interjurisdictional externalities
The costs of collective decision-making Consumer mobility and congestion costs
Appendix: The Decentralization Theorem and the
Optimal-Sized Jurisdiction 54
Chapter Three
The Theory and Use of Intergovernmental Grants 65
External effects and unit subsidies or taxes
Imperfect correspondence and intergovernmental grants
Conditional and unconditional grants and resource allocation
Unconditional intergovernmental grants and the redistribution of income
Unconditional grants and the problem of horizontal equity
Some reflections on the theory and use of intergovernmental grants
Appendix A: Reciprocal Externalities and Inter
governmental Grants 95
Appendix B: Intergovernmental Grants in a Model
of Collective Choice 105
Chapter Four
Taxation and Debt Finance in a Federal System 119
Criteria for the evaluation of a tax system Local spending and taxation: an analytic framework
A model of efficient local finance
The use of nonbenefit taxes by local governments Some further problems in local taxation
The case for tax harmonization A further role for intergovernmental grants: revenue sharing Debt finance in a federal system
Appendix: The Effects of Property Taxes and Local
Public Spending on Property Values:
An Empirical Study of Tax Capitaliza
tion and the Tiebout Hypothesis 162
Chapter Five
An Empirical Study of Federal Finance 181
Public policy for high employment and stable prices Public redistributive activity
An econometric study of the degree of fiscal centrali-zation Decentralization and the size of the public sector
Appendix: Complete Set of Regression Equations 214
Chapter Six
The Dynamics of Federalism
Dynamic tendencies in fiscal federalism Historical tendencies in fiscal centralization
The future of fiscal federalism
Data Appendix
Index
9780857939944
336 / OAT